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All actions, even the simplest like moving an arm to grasp a pen, are associated with
energy costs. Thus all mobile organisms possess the ability to evaluate resources and
select those behaviors that are most likely to lead to the greatest accrual of valuable items
(reward) in the near or, especially in the case of humans, distant future. The evaluation
process is performed at all possible stages of the series of decisions that lead to the
building of a goal-directed action or to its suppression. This is because all animals have a
limited amount of energy and resources; to survive and be able to reproduce they have to
minimize the costs and maximize the outcomes of their actions. These computations are
at the root of behavioral ﬂexibility. Two executive functions play a major role in generating
ﬂexible behaviors: (i) the ability to predict future outcomes of goal-directed actions; and
(ii) the ability to cancel them when they are unlikely to accomplish valuable results. These
two processes operate continuously during the entire course of a movement: during its
genesis, its planning and even its execution, so that the motor output can be modulated or
suppressed at any time before its execution. In this review, functional interactions of the
extended neural network subserving generation and inhibition of goal-directedmovements
will be outlined, leading to the intriguing hypothesis that the performance of actions and
their suppression are not speciﬁed by independent sets of brain regions. Rather, it will
be proposed that acting and stopping are functions emerging from speciﬁc interactions
between largely overlapping brain regions, whose activity is intimately linked (directly or
indirectly) to the evaluations of pros and cons of an action. Such mechanism would allow
the brain to perform as a highly efﬁcient and ﬂexible system, as different functions could
be computed exploiting the same components operating in different conﬁgurations.
Keywords: decision-making, reward, voluntarymotor control, behavioral flexibility, countermanding task, reaching
arm movements
INTRODUCTION
Our survival depends on the ability to gather, parse and evaluate
the stream of constantly changing environmental stimuli and to
ﬂexibly adapt our behavioral responses according to the context in
which we are embedded. This is because all animals operate with
limited resources, and thus the way they value their internal states,
sensory experience, and behavioral output inﬂuences directly how
they will invest their time and energy (Rangel et al., 2008). The
bottom line is that the opportunity of executing any action needs
to be continuously evaluated in order to minimize its costs and
to maximize its payoffs. In fact, the value associated with a cer-
tain stimulus is not an intrinsic property of the stimulus, but can
change as a function of the internal states of the agent at the time
the stimulus is encountered and as a function of agent’s previous
experience with that stimulus. For instance, for a thirsty gazelle
the water of a pond might represent a highly valuable stimulus,
unless it perceives the presence of hungry lions.
Central to this process are two executive functions: (i) the ability
to predict the future outcomes of a given action; and (ii) the ability
to suppress inappropriate, i.e., not sufﬁciently valuable, actions.
Importantly, these two executive functions operate not only during
the genesis of an action, but also during the planning of an already
selected action. In fact, during the temporal gap between the time
when an action has been chosen and the moment when the motor
output is going to be generated, the context might have changed,
altering the computed value of the action and thus requiring a
radical change of the planned motor strategy. For instance, the
sight of a tasty cake is likely to drive a child to plunge his ﬁngers
into the cream, but if, when he is about to act, he suddenly feels
he is observed by his parents, he will refrain from executing the
planned movement. In this instance, the fear of being punished
has overcome the potential reward of a sweet food, causing the
suppression of the pending action.
Conceptually, a goal-directed action can be modeled as multi-
step decision process to which several brain regions contribute
(see Figure 1; Table 1). The different stages leading up to
the execution or the inhibition of an action are described in
the next sections. The model I propose has been inspired by
that suggested by Haggard (2008). However, there are two
key differences between the former and the latter. First of all,
the new model does not necessarily subserve human volition
(see paragraph ‘Concluding Thoughts’). Secondly, in this new
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FIGURE 1 | Model of goal-directed actions.The model consists of a set of a
multi-step decision processes leading either to the execution or to the
inhibition of an action, according to the evaluation of its pros and cons. This
model does not have a strictly serial or parallel architecture. Some processes
must occur before others (e.g., the early “should-I-stay-or-should-I-go”
decision aimed at evaluating whether acting is worthwhile must occur before
goal or action selection), but other processes occur in parallel (e.g., the
monitoring system, whose role is to compute predictions about future reward
and to measure discrepancies between expected and actual outcomes, is
active during all the steps). See text for further details.
model, each stage of the process can be inﬂuenced by a com-
ponent named monitoring system, according to the results of
the outcomes of previous decisions (see paragraph ‘The Mon-
itoring System’). As a consequence the model I propose does
not work strictly in a serial fashion, but both serially and in
parallel.
Before proceeding, I want to remark that I will mostly deal
with upper limb action control, leaving aside saccadic eye move-
ment control. This is because the saccadic system has a different
functional organization from that controlling arm and hand
movements (e.g., see Churchland and Shenoy, 2007; Schall and
Godlove, 2012). For instance, a number of studies have provided
evidence that the inhibitory controls of eye and hand move-
ments are independent (e.g., Logan and Irwin, 2000; Boucher
et al., 2007; Sumner et al., 2007; Mirabella et al., 2011). Interest-
ingly, Mirabella et al. (2009) and Stevenson et al. (2009) studied
the effect of introducing a temporal gap between the end of
the ﬁxation and target presentation on the reaction times (RTs)
and on the speed of inhibition of reaching movements and
saccades, respectively. They found contrasting results: in the
former study the gap produced a decrease in the inhibitory
speed and in the latter an increase. This is not odd, as sac-
cades have a different ecological relevance from hand and arm
movements in primates. In fact, outside neurophysiology labora-
tories, they allow physical interactions with the environment, thus
leading to material outcomes such as acquisition of food or tools.
Nevertheless, it is likely that the very general principles, not the
ﬁne details, of the genesis of eye and limb movements are rather
similar.
THE MOTIVATION TO ACT (EARLY “SHOULD-I-STAY-OR-SHOULD-I-GO”
DECISION)
The ﬁrst step is represented by the motivation to act (early
“should-I-stay-or-should-I-go” decision). This is determined by
an evaluation process which is aimed at determining whether
or not the individual’s current needs are satisﬁed. The evalu-
ative process can be primed because of a change in either the
external environment (e.g., the sight of a cake) or the internal
states (e.g., a sudden hungry feeling), or both (e.g., the sight
of a cake prompts a hungry feeling). Thus, these ﬁrst com-
putations would evaluate whether or not the current state has
to be changed to pursue a desire (e.g., eating) against several
possible constraints (e.g., eating too much might cause weight
gain). If the motivation is considered worthwhile then move-
ment preparation will jump to the next stage, otherwise it will
be canceled.
This is an essential process and one which is continuously per-
formed by our motor system. In fact, in most places where we
live, if not all, we are surrounded by tools whose sight automat-
ically activates motor schemas that would normally be employed
to interact with those objects. These actions are prompted by
the features of the objects, the so-called affordances (Gibson,
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Table 1 | Summary of the main brain regions involved in each stage of the model describing the genesis of an arm goal oriented action, together
with the most relevant references.
Early “should-I-stay-or-
should-I-go”
decision
SMA/pre-SMA Boccardi et al. (2002), Grezes and Decety (2002), Biran and Chatterjee (2004),
Sumner et al. (2007), Forstmann et al. (2008), Ridderinkhof et al. (2011), van Gaal
et al. (2011)
Sector F5 (subregion of PMv)/PPC Murata et al. (1997), Rizzolatti and Luppino (2001)
Basal ganglia (dopaminergic
neurons; putamen and pallidum)
Mazzoni et al. (2007), Schmidt et al. (2008), Bonanni et al. (2010), for a review see
Turner and Desmurget (2010)
Goal selection OFC Damasio (1994), Padoa-Schioppa and Assad (2006), Fellows and Farah (2007),
Padoa-Schioppa and Assad (2008), for a review seeWallis (2007)
LPFC Hoshi et al. (2000), Barraclough et al. (2004), Genovesio et al. (2005, 2012), for a
review seeWise (2008)
Action selection PMd Cisek and Kalaska (2005), Klaes et al. (2011), for a review see Cisek and Kalaska
(2010)
PRR Calton et al. (2002), Cui and Andersen (2007), Scherberger and Andersen (2007)
Late “should-I-stay-or-
should-I-go”
decision
IFG/DLPFC (subregions of LPFC) Aron et al. (2003), Aron and Poldrack (2006), Chambers et al. (2006), Aron et al.
(2007), Zheng et al. (2008), Zandbelt and Vink (2010), Jahfari et al. (2012), Zandbelt
et al. (2013), for a review see Aron et al. (2014)
Pre-SMA Aron et al. (2007), Li et al. (2008), Chen et al. (2010), Zandbelt and Vink (2010),
Jahfari et al. (2012), Zandbelt et al. (2013)
Basal ganglia (striatum, STN) Aron and Poldrack (2006), Van denWildenberg et al. (2006), Aron et al. (2007), Li
et al. (2008), Zandbelt and Vink (2010), Swann et al. (2011), Mirabella et al. (2012)
PMd and M1 Coxon et al. (2006), Swann et al. (2009), Mirabella et al. (2011), Mattia et al. (2012),
Mattia et al. (2013)
PPC Chikazoe et al. (2009), Jahfari et al. (2010), Zandbelt et al. (2013)
Action execution PMd and M1 Tanji and Evarts (1976), Georgopoulos et al. (1982),Weinrich et al. (1984), Riehle and
Requin (1989), Hoshi andTanji (2000), Hoshi andTanji (2002), Churchland et al.
(2006), for a review see Shenoy et al. (2013)
Spinal cord Prut and Fetz (1999)
Basal ganglia (STN) Paradiso et al. (2003), Loukas and Brown (2004), Mirabella et al. (2013)
Monitoring system ACC Bernstein et al. (1995), Brown and Braver (2005), Kennerley et al. (2006), Sheth
et al. (2012)
Basal ganglia (dopaminergic
neurons; ventral striatum)
Schultz et al. (1997), O’Doherty et al. (2003), Montague et al. (2004), Bayer and
Glimcher (2005), Chikazoe et al. (2009), Zandbelt and Vink (2010), Jahfari et al.
(2012), Zandbelt et al. (2013)
Frontal pole cortex (subregion of
PFC)
Tsujimoto et al. (2010), for a review seeTsujimoto et al. (2011)
SMA/pre-SMA Chikazoe et al. (2009), Chen et al. (2010), Scangos and Stuphorn (2010), Zandbelt
and Vink (2010), Jahfari et al. (2012), Zandbelt et al. (2013), Bonini et al. (2014)
SMA, supplementary motor area; pre-SMA, pre-supplementary motor area; PMv, ventral premotor cortex; PPC, posterior parietal cortex; LPFC, lateral prefrontal
cortex; DLPFC, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex; PMd, dorsal premotor cortex; PRR, parietal reach region; IFG, inferior frontal gyrus; STN, subthalamic nucleus; M1,
primary motor cortex; ACC, anterior cingulate cortex; FPC, frontal pole cortex.
1979). It has been shown that even the simple observation of
pictures depicting affordable objects (such as graspable objects)
activates a sub-region of the medial frontal cortex, the supple-
mentary motor area (SMA; see Figure 2), even when there is no
requirement to actually act on those stimuli (Grezes and Decety,
2002). These stimulus-driven activations are rapid, involuntary,
and unconscious.
Sumner et al. (2007), using subliminal stimuli to prime move-
ments in a direction opposite to the requested one, showed that
while control subjects were able to withhold unwanted actions,
patients with microlesions of the SMA or the supplementary eye
ﬁelds (SEFs) were impaired during the execution of hand or eye
movements, respectively. They concluded that the SMA and SEF
mediate automatic effector-speciﬁc suppression of motor plans.
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FIGURE 2 | Medial frontal cortex (details of the medial portion of
Brodmann areas 6 and 8). Midsagittal view of the medial wall (left) and
lateral prefrontal cortex (LPFC) surface (right), delineating the supplementary
motor area (SMA), supplementary eye ﬁeld (SEF) and pre-supplementary
motor area (pre-SMA). Reproduced with permission from Ridderinkhof et al.
(2011).
However, there is another way to look at those automatic activa-
tions: they might represent the activity of the network subserving
the evaluative process which is at the base of the early “should-I-
stay-or-should-I-go” decision. In other words, affordances might
increase the motivation to act, but to execute an action they have
to be coupled with an internal state congruent with the primed
action (e.g., the sight of a glass of water will prime the action if
and only if an individual is thirsty; see Figure 1).
From this perspective the suppression of a triggered action
might be seen not as an active process, but rather as an automatic
consequence of the evaluative procedure. Using this framework,
is possible to put forward a functional hypothesis underling two
rare neuropsychological disorders, the alien limb syndrome and
the utilization behavior. Both diseases are characterized by the
fact that patients cannot resist objects’ affordance, and they are
automatically forced to perform stimulus-driven motor responses
even when they do not need those objects (Humphreys and
Riddoch, 2000). Patients with the alien hand syndrome per-
form involuntary actions with the limb contralateral to a focal
brain lesion most frequently located in the medial frontal cor-
tex, usually involving the SMA (Della Sala et al., 1991; Biran
and Chatterjee, 2004). Patients suffering from utilization behav-
ior compulsively grasp and use objects placed within their reach.
This syndrome has been linked to bilateral damage to the medial
frontal region involving the SMA, pre-SMA, and cingulate motor
areas (Boccardi et al., 2002). Therefore, at least to some extent,
the sites of the lesions causing those syndromes are largely over-
lapping, with the difference that in the former case it is located
just in one hemisphere whereas in the latter case it affects
both hemispheres. Possibly what is affected in both syndromes
is the circuitry underlying the early “should-I-stay-or-should-I-
go” evaluation, so that most stimulus-driven activations are no
longer matched with our internal needs and thus they cannot be
ﬁltered out.
The discovery of the so-called canonical neurons in monkeys’
lateral premotor area F5 may represent the neural mechanisms
underlying responsiveness to object affordances (Murata et al.,
1997). These neurons become active both when grasping an object
and when seeing the same object without moving (Murata et al.,
1997), and they are likely to feed the neural network of the medial
frontal region which presides over the evaluation of whether to
act. In fact, the lateral premotor area F5 receives projections from
several regions of the posterior parietal cortex (PPC; Rizzolatti
and Luppino, 2001), which is the end point of a crucial pathway
for the visual guidance of actions toward objects, named the dor-
sal stream (Milner and Goodale, 1995). As such, PPC and F5 are
likely to play a key role in visuomotor transformations, providing a
neurophysiological correlate of stimulus-driven action affordance.
Several lines of evidence indicate that the fate of these acti-
vations might be decided in pre-SMA, which would act as a gate
throughwhich the available action affordancesmight be translated
into actual actions (Ridderinkhof et al., 2011). First of all, a func-
tional magnetic imaging (fMRI) study has shown that the strength
of activation in pre-SMA covaries with the extent of inappropriate
responses driven by stimulus-action association, i.e., the selection
of appropriate action engages stronger activation of the pre-SMA
in the face of many competing alternatives (Forstmann et al.,
2008). Second, a strong negative correlation has been demon-
strated between pre-SMA gray-matter volume and the inability
to efﬁciently deal with competing response tendencies (van Gaal
et al., 2011).
It would be very reductive to limit this ﬁrst stage to the ﬁltering
of stimulus-driven action affordances and to the medial frontal
regions. In fact, a role is surely also played by those brain regions
that underlie arousal regulation (in particular the dopaminergic
system), increasing or decreasing the readiness of animals to react.
There are a wide variety of stimuli that can trigger arousal, from
relatively simple sensory stimuli (e.g., the smell of blood or the
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sound of a mating call) to much more complex situations (e.g., the
feeling of social exclusion or the feeling of being idolized). These
signals prompt some basic instincts or learned memories which,
according to the current contextual situation, might change the
internal state of the animals, triggering an alert state. In these
instances, animals do not yet have a goal, but they are more
ready to act. The dopaminergic system is likely to play an impor-
tant role in this stage of action genesis as witnessed by one of
the symptoms of the most severe form Parkinson’s disease (PD),
the akinesia, i.e., the inability to initiate any goal-directed move-
ment. Akinesia is not a pure motor disturbance, because it has
been shown that in situations of great emergency (e.g., a missile
attack, an earthquake) otherwise akinetic PD patients can show a
sudden transient ability to move (paradoxical kinesia; Glickstein
and Stein, 1991; Schlesinger et al., 2007; Bonanni et al., 2010).
Evidently, when dopamine neurons are remarkably reduced in
number, all behavioral options or internal mental states would
appear to have the same value as the current state. In the face
of this ﬂat value function, the best choice for PD patients is to
freeze. In extreme situations, salient stimuli may elicit stronger
discharge of dopaminergic cells than normal, driving the patient
to act. Recently, Mazzoni et al. (2007) suggested that even in less
dramatic situations the slowness of movements (bradikinesia) in
PD patients may be attributable to an improper evaluation of
movement energy costs. In these experiments, PD patients and
healthy controls were asked to move their arm to a previously
speciﬁed target at different speeds a given number of times. Both
were able to make required movements with the same accuracy,
but PD patients needed signiﬁcantly more trials before reaching
the required number of repetitions. As the accuracy of patients
was the same as that of controls, authors concluded that the loss of
dopamine did not cause bradykinesia through a speed-accuracy
trade-off. Rather, it affected decision-making through a faulty
evaluation of the costs of movements, i.e., allocation of the cor-
rect amount of energy to meet the demands of the task. In other
words, PD weakened the key link between motivation and move-
ment gain. In fact, the dopaminergic system has been shown to
play a major role in reward-dependent learning (e.g., Schultz et al.,
1997; Montague et al., 2004).
Other evidence indicates that the regulation of action motiva-
tion based on previous experiences is one of the main functions of
the basal ganglia, not just of the dopaminergic system (Turner and
Desmurget, 2010). This hypothesis is supported by one symptom
which often accompanies focal damage of the basal ganglia, the
so-called auto-activation deﬁcit or abulia (Habib, 2004), in which
patients suffer from a marked deﬁcit in motivation to perform
spontaneous acts despite an absence of overt motor impairment.
In particular, Schmidt et al. (2008) asked patients suffering from
auto-activation deﬁcit, due to bilateral lesions of the putamen or
pallidum, to control grip forces in response either to explicit sen-
sory instructions or to monetary incentives. Although they fully
understood the instructions, patients were capable of modulating
their movement only in the former, not in the latter, condition.
All in all, it is clear that there are several brain regions
that regulate the willingness to act. This early “should-I-stay-
or-should-I-go” decision should play a key role because it would
activate (or stop) the chain of other decisions that will potentially
lead to action execution. While many other subsequent stages
might be performed in parallel, this ﬁrst one is likely to be a stand-
alone process during which no actions are planned and thus there
is no need for any neural signal to inhibit them.
GOAL SELECTION
Once performance of an action is considered worthwhile, because
a need has to be satisﬁed, the next set of decisions will be devoted
to the selection of the most opportune goal among the several dif-
ferent alternatives usually available (e.g., to satisfy the feeling of
hunger we might decide to eat the cake in front of us or to leave
the room and go to a restaurant). This process possibly entails
two stages: ﬁrst, values are assigned to each available option and
subsequently a decision is taken weighting these values according
to the behavioral context (e.g., Glimcher et al., 2005). Even though
this schema is conceptually logical, it is very unlikely that neu-
ral processing would be strictly organized in distinct serial stages.
As depicted in Figure 1, it is very likely that multiple potential
goals are simultaneously represented. To each goal a given value
would be assigned and weighted according to the situation. As
multiple goals cannot be pursued at the same time, these rep-
resentations probably start to compete with each other, perhaps
through mutual inhibition (Figure 1). This competition can be
biased by several factors which ultimately inﬂuence the expected
outcome of the action1. In this review I will argue that these bias-
ing signals might come from the brain regions of the “monitoring
system,” i.e., the system that evaluates and stores the outcome of
past actions (see Figure 1 and see The Monitoring System). Value
assignment and the competition might occur at the same time,
probably in different sectors of the prefrontal cortex (PFC). PFC
is not a homogeneous structure but is composed of multiple areas
that differ in terms of cytoarchitecture and anatomical connec-
tions with other areas (Petrides and Pandya, 1999, 2002; Figure 3).
Thus, it is likely that each area might perform its own function;
however, their exact roles are not yet clear. Part of the reason is
that the PFC contributes to a bewildering array of functions (Wise,
2008).
Nevertheless, converging evidence argues that orbitofrontal
cortex (OFC) plays a key role in linking stimuli to their values
(for a review see Wallis, 2007). Indeed, lesions to the OFC impair
choice behavior, leading to unreliable choices (e.g., Damasio, 1994;
Fellows and Farah, 2007) or abnormal gambling (e.g., Camille
et al., 2004; Koenigs and Tranel, 2007). Padoa-Schioppa and Assad
(2006), recording single-units in monkeys, demonstrated that a
particular class of neurons of the OFC (“chosen neurons”) encode
the subjective value of two different drinks (juice and water) irre-
spective of their taste, volumeor the action that needs to be taken to
obtain them. Thus these cells encoded value per se, allowing a com-
parison for qualitatively different goods. Later on, Padoa-Schioppa
and Assad (2008) also showed that the discharge of these neurons
was independent of the presence of other goods. These ﬁndings
indicate that the OFC produces stable value representations, i.e., a
key trait of choices, because it allows abstract comparisons such as
1An exception to this model might occur when the number of potential goals
exceeds the capacity of workingmemory. In these instances goalsmight be processed
differently.
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FIGURE 3 | Areas composing the prefrontal cortex (PFC) according to
the parcellation of Petrides and Pandya (1999, 2002). (A) Areas of
the lateral PFC. The inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) corresponds to Brodmann
area (BA) 44, or pars opercolaris, to BA45, or pars triangularis, and to
BA47/12, or pars orbitalis. The dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC)
corresponds to BA9/46 and BA46. (B) Areas of the medial wall of the
PFC. The anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) corresponds to BA32, BA24,
and BA25 (dorsocaudal portions are indicated with a hyphen). BA10
corresponds to the frontopolar cortex. The orbitofrontal cortex (OFC)
corresponds to BA11 and BA14. (C) Areas of ventral orbital surface of
the PFC. BA10 corresponds to the frontopolar cortex. Area BA47/12
corresponds to the pars orbitalis of the IFG. The OFC corresponds to
BA11, BA13, and BA14. Reproduced with permission from Ridderinkhof
et al. (2004).
transitivity between different goods which are not available at the
same time.
On the other hand, to select properly the more appropriate
goal, the values of the options must be evaluated in light of the
situation which an animal has to face (e.g., if an animal is starving
even a non-preferred food represents a good choice). Therefore,
to represent value efﬁciently in different situations, a neuronal
representation should ﬂexibly adapt to the current context. These
computations are probably carried on in lateral prefrontal cor-
tex (LPFC). Several studies have shown that neural activities of
those areas specify the so-called task sets. A task set is a conﬁgu-
ration of perceptual, attentional, mnemonic, and motor processes
that is actively maintained to perform a given task. It speciﬁes
the rules needed to solve the speciﬁc task, but it is independent
of the stimuli as long as they have to be processed in the same
way. Therefore it is not surprising that the PFC contributes to
an enormous array of functions ranging from selective attention
(Lebedev et al., 2004) to working memory (Funahashi et al., 1989),
problem-solving strategies (Genovesio et al., 2005) and catego-
rization of sensory stimuli (Freedman et al., 2002). This list is
by no means exhaustive, but it is intended to give an idea of
the several kinds of knowledge that are processed in the LPFC.
Recently, a series of studies has provided evidence about the
way in which this array of cognitive processes can be combined
to produce sophisticated behavior (Genovesio et al., 2005, 2006,
2012). The logic underlying all these experiments was that of
setting tasks which require several kinds of long-term and short-
term knowledge, while recording single-unit activity in the LPFC.
For instance, Genovesio et al. (2005) trained monkeys to make
a saccade to the left, right, or upward direction in response to
a visual object, depending on the cue and on the goal that had
occurred on the previous trial (Figure 4). This way the monkeys
could not learn a ﬁxed stimulus-response association. Instead,
they had to adopt repeat-stay and change-shift strategies, i.e., if
the cue was the same as in the previous successful trial the mon-
keys repeated the response, while if the cue was different they
had to change their response. Genovesio et al. (2005) found that
the activity of some single-neurons in the dorsolateral prefrontal
cortex (DLPFC) represent different strategies, that is, special kinds
of abstract rules acquired on the basis of task performance history.
Similarly, Barraclough et al. (2004) found that DLPFC neurons
encoded monkeys’ past decisions and payoffs, providing crucial
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FIGURE 4 | Role of dorsolateral prefrontal cortex during a “strategy
task.” (A)Temporal sequence of the visual displays during the task and
behavioral responses required of the monkeys. Each trial began when
monkeys ﬁxated on a spot at the center of the display (gaze direction is
indicated by the dashed lines). After a delay, a cue appeared. When it
disappeared, the monkeys had to make a saccadic eye movement to one of
three positions (unﬁlled squares). Monkeys were required to remember both
the cue and the goal of the trial just performed because the response on the
next trial (current trial) depended on the previous choice, i.e., if the cue was
the same as in the previous successful trial, the monkeys repeated the
response (repeat trial), while if the cue was different they had to change their
response (change trial). Thus, monkeys were forced to change strategy
according to the past trial history, adopting either a repeat-stay strategy or a
change-shift strategy (B) Neural activity reﬂecting the previous goal (red), the
future goal (blue), the correct strategy (solid green line), and the wrong
strategy (dashed green line). Previous-goal signal decreased after cue onset
as the signals for the correct strategy and future goal increased. In contrast,
when monkeys chose the wrong strategy, a weak or absent strategy signal
occurred during the time of goal selection. Reproduced with permission from
Wise (2008).
signals to update estimates of expected reward. Thus, according
to the authors the activity of these cells subserves the optimiza-
tion of decision-making strategies. Other neurons in the same area
represented ﬁxed stimulus–response mappings learned previously
(Hoshi et al., 2000).
All in all it seems that the different subregions of the LPFC
process several types of knowledge and, taking into account the
context in which the animals operate and the outcome of the
action performed, allow the performance of non-routine, i.e.,
ﬂexible, behaviors (Wise, 2008). Clearly such complex elabora-
tions cannot be done in isolation. In fact, it has been recently
proposed that information about several different metrics of avail-
able resources in the surrounding environment (e.g., numeros-
ity, duration, distance) are provided to the LPFC by the PPC
(Genovesio et al., 2014). Certainly, along the fronto-parietal net-
work attentive signals ﬂow bidirectionally, allowing the selection
of salient stimuli during visually guided movements (e.g., Lebe-
dev and Wise, 2001; for reviews see Corbetta and Shulman, 2002;
Reynolds and Chelazzi, 2004). Two other relevant sources of infor-
mation are the OFC, which, as described at the beginning of this
paragraph, delivers knowledge about the value of the stimuli, and
the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and/or the pre-SMA, which
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deliver signals dealing with prediction of expected outcome (see
The Monitoring System). In addition, sensory areas could also
contribute to this process. For instance, it has been found that
activity of neurons in macaque area V4 can underlie the selection
of elemental object features and their translation into a response-
related format that can directly contribute to the control of the
animal’s actions (Mirabella et al., 2007).
These are just a few examples; many cortical and subcortical
structures are connected with the PFC, which is optimally sit-
uated to gather and synthesize information to select the more
appropriate goal, and the best task set to achieve it in a given
context.
ACTION SELECTION
Even though goal and strategies are selected in the PFC, there are
several lines of evidence indicating that choosing between alter-
native actions to achieve an identiﬁed goal and the generation of
speciﬁc motor commands (i.e., motor plans) are accomplished
by neural populations in the dorsal premotor cortex (PMd; Cisek
and Kalaska, 2005; Klaes et al., 2011), in the primary motor cor-
tex (Tanji and Evarts, 1976) and in the so-called parietal reach
region (PRR), a subregion of the PPC (Cui and Andersen, 2007;
Scherberger and Andersen, 2007). Therefore goal selection and
the selection of movements to reach them are two separate pro-
cesses that, to some extent, are likely to occur one after the
other.
As most goals can be achieved in any of several ways, mul-
tiple potential actions are possibly represented at the same time
and start to compete for implementation2. That this was the
case was demonstrated by Cisek and Kalaska (2005) in a semi-
nal experiment. While recording from PMd, they set a task in
which two spatial cues indicated two opposite potential reaching
actions. After a delay, a non-spatial cue speciﬁed the correct choice
(Figure 5). Soon after the presentation of the two cues, the neural
activity of PMd speciﬁed both directions of potential reach targets
simultaneously. When information for selecting the correct action
became available, its neural representation was strengthened while
the other was suppressed.
On these grounds, the authors hypothesized that PMd prepares
multiple actions in parallel and selects between them through a
process of biased competition taking place within the same neural
substrate that guides the execution of those actions (Cisek, 2006;
Cisek and Kalaska, 2010). Thus, the mechanism of action selection
is likely to occur in a similar way to that underlying goal selection
(Figure 1).
Dorsal premotor cortex is not the only site where multiple
potential actions can be represented. In fact, it has been shown that
if a monkey is presented with a spatial target, but not instructed
about whether an arm or a saccadic eye movement is required,
neurons begin to discharge simultaneously in different regions of
the PPC, the lateral and the medial intraparietal sulcus (LIP and
MIP, respectively; Calton et al., 2002; Cui and Andersen, 2007).
These discharges represent the simultaneous coding of saccade
2As previously stated for the representation of multiple goals, even in this instance
the representation of multiple potential movements may be limited by the capacity
of working memory.
FIGURE 5 |Time course of population activity in the dorsal premotor
cortex during a reach-selection task.The diagrams on the left replicate
the temporal sequence of the visual displays during the task. Each trial
began with the monkeys moving the cursor (+) into a central green circle.
Next, a red and a blue cue circle appeared at two of eight possible target
positions, in opposite directions from the center for about a second (ﬁrst
display, “Spatial cues”). Then the cues disappeared (second display,
“Memory period”) and after a variable period the central circle changed
color to red or blue (third display, “Color cue”). Finally, the go signal was
delivered (fourth display). The central circle disappeared and green circles
appeared at all eight positions. To perform correctly the monkeys had to
move the cursor from the central circle to the target indicated by the color
cue. The 3-D colored surface on the right depicts changes of neural activity
along time with respect to baseline, with cells sorted by their preferred
direction along the bottom edge. Note that during the entire period of
ambiguity until the presentation of the color cue, the population encoded
both potential directions.When the color cue provided the information for
selecting the correct action, its neural representation was strengthened
while the other was suppressed. Reproduced with permission from Cisek
and Kalaska (2010).
and reach plans. Later, if an arm movement is cued (Calton et al.,
2002) or freely chosen (Cui and Andersen, 2007), the activity of
MIP becomes stronger than that of LIP, and vice versa if a saccade
is instructed or chosen.
Recently, Klaes et al. (2011) conﬁrm and extended these ﬁnd-
ings by demonstrating that in situations of uncertain choice, the
frontoparietal reach areas (PRR and PMd) construct all potential
motor alternatives. However, Klaes et al. (2011) made a further
step showing that that potential actions were also biased by the
monkeys’ subjective desirability, conﬁrming the model proposed
by Cisek (2006).
All in all, these ﬁndings seem to indicate that in the frontopari-
etal reach areas there is a continuous and simultaneous processing
of multiple movement options. Possibly, as some computational
models predict (e.g., Smith and Ratcliff, 2004), neural activity
related to response choices, i.e., the motor plans, builds up in
separate accumulators as a function of the evidence for or against
them until one reaches a threshold, winning the competition.
What a motor plan is or what it represents is a very debated
issue. It is generally accepted that the motor plan is formed in the
premotor cortex and inM1 (Tanji and Evarts, 1976;Weinrich et al.,
1984), but what is encoded by the neural activity of the motor cor-
tices and how it relates to movement activity are matters of some
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controversy. It has been proposed that the discharge of single-unit
might represent a subthreshold version of movement (Tanji and
Evarts, 1976) or that population activity represents some move-
ment parameters (e.g., reach direction and distance Georgopoulos
et al., 1982; Riehle and Requin, 1989) or even the combination
between information about the target and about the effector used
(Hoshi and Tanji, 2000, 2002). However, all these approaches have
been proven to be inconsistent or equivocal in fully explaining
the activity in the motor system (for a review see Shenoy et al.,
2013).
An alternative proposal is that this activity reﬂects a mix of
signals: “some will be outputs to drive the spinal cord and mus-
cles, but many will be internal processes that help to compose the
outputs, but are themselves only poorly described in terms of the
movement” (Shenoy et al., 2013, p. 339). In other words, the activ-
ity that precedes a movement would represent the initial state
of a dynamic system which will determine the temporal pat-
terns needed to drive actions. Under this hypothesis the motor
plan does not explicitly represent movement parameters; it is still
closely related to movement activity, but the reciprocal relation-
ship is not transparent at the level of the individual cells. This
framework seems to reconcile several past, apparently contra-
dictory, ﬁndings and to provide a wider comprehension of the
functioning of the cortical motor system (Shenoy et al., 2013).
One possible limit of the dynamic system hypothesis, that future
studies will have to overcome, is that most of the data come
from experiments in which there is a delay between the appear-
ance of the target and the go signal (delayed-reach task, e.g.,
Churchland et al., 2006). Clearly, to be fully validated the hypoth-
esis should be tested in tasks featuring performance or inhibition
of reaching movements in different contexts (but see Mattia et al.,
2013).
In conclusion, the same substrates where the action selec-
tions occur are also those that are used to prepare and guide the
execution of the movement that is ultimately selected.
THE FINAL EVALUATION (LATE “SHOULD-I-STAY-OR-SHOULD-I-GO”
DECISION)
By the end of the previous stages, what had been evaluated as the
best action to achieve the desired goal is planned, but before the
corresponding motor plan can be executed it has to pass a further
ﬁnal check (late “should-I-stay-or-should-I-go” decision). This is
a fundamental step, because from the moment at which the deci-
sion to act has been taken to the time when the motor output is
about to be generated, the continuous ﬂow of information might
signal that something has changed in the external environment,
in the internal states or in both. These changes might impact on
the previous evaluations as the selected action might turn out
to be no longer appropriate (Haggard, 2008). A common expe-
rience might be that of a person about to cross a road but, just
before stepping onto the road, he hears the sound of an ambu-
lance siren clearly approaching. In the most common instance,
the person would halt his step to avoid being hit. However, the
evaluation might be radically different if his/her child is already
in the middle of the road. In the former case suppressing the
action is clearly the most valuable decision but, in the latter, the
risk of losing the parental investment might trigger the person
to act even faster in order to secure the child. The evaluation
could be also inﬂuenced by endogenous signals, for instance the
same person in the above example could take the risk of cross-
ing the road because he suddenly remembers that his plane is
leaving.
Computationally this last check could be realized by comparing
the output of a predictive forward model with a goal description
(e.g., see Wolpert and Miall, 1996). When the mismatch between
the predicted result and the goal becomes too large, i.e., the action
is unlikely to allow the achievement of the desired result, the
pending action is canceled. There are several tasks that are cur-
rently exploited to study the inhibitory function and each has
some advantages over the others (for a review see Ridderinkhof
et al., 2011); however, in order to design a potential neural net-
work capable of augmenting inhibition of pending actions, I will
focus on the stop-signal paradigm (Logan and Cowan, 1984).
There are two reasons to choose this as a paradigmatic task.
Firstly it is the only one which allows study of the suppression
of ongoing movements, and secondly it has been widely used
exploiting several effectors (the eyes, e.g., see Hanes and Schall,
1996; the ﬁnger, e.g., see Logan and Cowan, 1984; the arm, e.g.,
see Mirabella et al., 2006); thus a wealth of data are available. The
stop-signal (or countermanding) paradigm probes a subject’s abil-
ity to withhold a planned movement triggered by a go signal when
an infrequent stop-signal is presented after a variable delay (see
Figure 6A).
Starting from the behavioral performance during the counter-
manding task it is possible to yield an estimate of the duration of
the suppression process [stop-signal reaction time (SSRT); Logan
and Cowan, 1984; Band et al., 2003; Boucher et al., 2007]. The
SSRT is a key behavioral parameter for uncovering the neural sub-
strates of inhibition. In fact, those brain regions showing a change
in activity when a movement is produced with respect to when it
is suppressed, and where the onset of this shift precedes the end of
the SSRT, can be assumed to be causally related to the suppression
process.
Thus the stop-signal task allows to study of the way subjects
react to an unexpected imperative stop instruction. This is referred
to as “reactive inhibition.” At the same time, this approach also
allows assessment of changes in the response strategies of individ-
uals embedded in such an experimental context. In fact, the rules
of the countermanding task create a conﬂict on all no-stop trials
because subjects are instructed to move as fast as possible, but, at
the same time, they tend to delay movement initiation to wait for
the occurrence of a possible stop-signal. As a consequence, healthy
subjects had longer RTs when executing go-trials intermixed with
stop-trials than when executing go-trials alone (e.g., Mirabella
et al., 2006; Verbruggen and Logan, 2009). In addition, the occur-
rence of stop trials induces a lengthening of the RTs of responses
produced in the immediately subsequent no-stop trials (Mirabella
et al., 2006, 2012;Verbruggen and Logan, 2009; Zandbelt andVink,
2010). This form of control over response execution in antici-
pation of known task demands, driven by endogenous signals,
i.e., the awareness of the possible presentation of stop-signals, has
been called “proactive control/inhibition.” In the following, I will
describe results mainly related to reactive inhibition, while I will
mainly focus on proactive inhibition in the next paragraph where
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FIGURE 6 | Causal role of neurons of the dorsal premotor cortex (PMd)
in reactive inhibition. (A)Temporal sequence of the visual displays for
no-stop and stop trials in the reaching version of the countermanding task.
All trials began with the presentation of a central stimulus. After a variable
holding delay (500–800 ms) it disappeared and simultaneously a target
appeared to the right, acting as a go-signal. In the no-stop trials subjects had
to start a speeded reaching movement toward the peripheral target.
Randomly, on a fraction of interleaved trials (33%), the central stimulus
reappeared after variable delays (SSDs), instructing subjects to inhibit
movement initiation. In these stop trials, if subjects countermanded the
planned movement keeping the arm on the central stimulus the trial was
scored as a stop-success trial. Otherwise, if subjects executed the reaching
movement the trial was scored as a stop-failure trial (not shown).
Reproduced with permission from Mattia et al. (2012). (B) Changes of activity
driven by the stop-signal onset in PMd neurons modulated during the
preparation of the movement. In each panel the upper graph represents the
average spike density function while the lower graph shows the raster plots
of neural activity in no-stop trials (green tick-marks) and stop-success trials
(red tick-marks). Neural activity was always aligned to the go-signal onset
(ﬁrst vertical line). The gray band represents the estimated duration of the
stop-signal reaction time (SSRT) in that session. The gray line represents the
differential spike density function, while the dashed gray line represents the
threshold value for signiﬁcant divergence. The green and the orange vertical
dotted lines in the top panels indicate the average RT and the average end of
MT, respectively. The green dots in the rasters represent the end of the RTs.
On the right, the activity of a representative “type A” countermanding
neuron is shown. In this cell, neural activity during stop-success trials (red
line) initially resembles that of no-stop trials (green line) but, with a delay
after the stop-signal presentation, it suddenly starts to decrease and the
differential spike density function crosses the threshold 34.4 ms before the
end of the SSRT. On the left, the activity of a representative “type B”
countermanding neuron is shown. In this instance, the activity in
stop-success trials increases after stop-signal presentation with respect to
that recorded during no-stop trials 39.9 ms before the end of the SSRT.
Therefore both these two types of neurons exhibit a modulation of activity
sufﬁcient to control the suppression of an ongoing arm movement.
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I will deal with the monitoring system (but see also Action Exe-
cution). Clearly, all proactive strategies necessarily derive from
these computations. This does not mean the neural substrates
of reactive and proactive inhibition have to be different. In fact,
it has been shown that there is an overlap between them (e.g.,
Jahfari et al., 2012; Zandbelt et al., 2013; for a review see Aron,
2011); however, reactive and proactive inhibition might derive
from two conceptually different modules (the late “should-I-stay-
or-should-I-go” decision module and the monitoring system; see
Figure 1).
Variants of the stop-signal task have been used several times
in association with different techniques [e.g., single-unit record-
ings, fMRI, electroencephalographic scalp recordings (EEG),
intracranial electroencephalographic recordings (iEEF), lesions,
transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS), deep brain stimula-
tion (DBS)], different effectors (the eyes, the arm, and the
ﬁngers), and different pathologies (e.g., PD, attention deﬁcit and
hyperactivity disorder, Tourette syndrome, obsessive–compulsive
disorder). From this large number of studies, a network of
brain regions that seem to be involved in implementing inhi-
bition has been identiﬁed. To this network belong both corti-
cal and subcortical structures, that largely overlap with those
involved in movement generation, planning, and even movement
execution.
One of the prefrontal regions that more frequently has been
reported to have an inhibitory role is the inferior frontal gyrus
(IFG), especially in the right hemisphere (see Aron et al., 2014
for a recent review). For instance, Aron et al. (2003) have shown
that humans with a lesion to the right, but not to the left IFG
exhibit longer SSRTs than healthy subjects. Furthermore they
showed that the lengthening of the SSRT was proportional to the
extent of damage in the right IFG. Less frequently, the DLPFC
has also been claimed to participate in this executive function
(e.g., Zheng et al., 2008). However, its role is controversial. In fact,
while Zheng et al. (2008) showed that individuals who were more
proﬁcient at inhibition had a greater activation in DLPF, Cham-
bers et al. (2006) found that temporary deactivation of the same
region, with repetitive TMS, did not signiﬁcantly alter the speed
of inhibition.
Imagining studies revealed the involvement in this form of
inhibition of the pre-SMA (e.g., Aron et al., 2007; Li et al., 2008;
Zandbelt andVink, 2010; Jahfari et al., 2012) as well as of the stria-
tum (Li et al., 2008; Zandbelt andVink, 2010). Even in this instance
the exact role of these structures is unclear and debated. Li et al.
(2008) compared the fMRI brain activation of individuals with
short versus long SSRTs who were identical in all other aspects of
stop-signal performance. Their aim was to isolate the neural cor-
relates of response inhibition from those of response monitoring
and/or attentional control. Under these experimental conditions,
Li et al. (2008) found that the caudate head had greater activation
in individuals with short than with long SSRT, and the extent of its
activation was positively correlated with activity in the pre-SMA.
In contrast, Scangos and Stuphorn (2010), by recording single-
neuron activity of SMA and pre-SMA of monkeys during an arm
countermanding task, found that these cells could not contribute
directly to response inhibition as most of them modulate after
the SSRT. Instead, the majority of neurons signaled expectation
of reward, as they were modulated by the amount of expected
reward.
Another basal ganglion implicated in stopping ongoing actions
is the subthalamic nucleus (STN; see Aron and Poldrack, 2006).
Mirabella et al. (2012) demonstrated that bilateral STN DBS selec-
tively improves inhibitory functions as its electrical stimulation
signiﬁcantly shortened the SSRT, but did not inﬂuence the RTs of
no-stop trials. These results agree with those of Van den Wilden-
berg et al. (2006) and Swann et al. (2011), but not with those of
Li et al. (2008). In the above-described study, they found that
neither the STN nor the IFG were active during reactive stop
and thus concluded that both structures had a role in atten-
tional monitoring of the stop-signal. Similarly, Zandbelt andVink
(2010) did not ﬁnd evidence of STN activation during movement
cancelation.
Finally, two other areas have been found to be involved
in inhibitory function, i.e., the PMd (Mirabella et al., 2011;
Mattia et al., 2012, 2013) and the primary motor cortex (M1;
Coxon et al., 2006; Swann et al., 2009; Mattia et al., 2012).
Mirabella et al. (2011) showed that about 30% of PMd cells
changed their discharge before the end of the SSRT when the
monkey had to stop a reaching movement. Thus these neurons
seem to be causally involved in reactive inhibition (see Figure 6B).
These ﬁndings were conﬁrmed and extended by a subsequent
study (Mattia et al., 2012), in which epicortical event-related
potentials (ERPs) were recorded from the lateral surface of the
fronto-temporal lobes of epileptic patients performing the coun-
termanding task. It was found that an ERP complex was selectively
expressed before the end of the SSRT in M1, and in the premotor
cortex (Figure 7). Thus, Mattia et al. (2012) deduced that motor
cortices are causally involved in inhibitory control. In conclusion,
even though the exact role of each of the brain regions involved in
the stop task remains controversial, it clearly emerges a consider-
able overlap between brain region subserving the preparation of
an action and its suppression (see Table 1).
To summarize, the late “should-I-stay-or-should-I-go” deci-
sion represents a hinge of our goal-directed behavior because it
allows crucial, last-minute changes of strategies when the cost
of an action overcomes the beneﬁts. Unlike the early “should-
I-stay-or-should-I-go” decision, which does not require active
suppression, in this instance some neural signals aiming to halt
the activity linked to the ongoing action have to be produced by
the nervous system (Figure 1). Given this, it should not come as
a surprise that such a large network of brain regions has to be
involved.
ACTION EXECUTION
Once the last check is passed, the motor commands are sent to
the spinal cord, activate the muscles, and produce the move-
ment. It must be remarked that it is very unlikely that even
the spinal cord would be a passive relay of “higher directives.”
In fact, Prut and Fetz (1999) have shown that spinal interneu-
rons show pre-movement activity during a delayed task, similarly
to PMd (Wise et al., 1983). This indicates that, at least under
some experimental conditions, movement preparation may occur
simultaneously over widely distributed regions, including spinal
levels.
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FIGURE 7 | Spatiotemporal distribution of stop-event related potentials
(ERPs) in successful-stop (SS) trials. (A) Average stop-ERPs (solid red
curves) of SS trials centered on stop-signal appearance corresponding to the
selected channels for one pharmacoresistant epileptic patient. Gray areas,
time intervals at which the stop-ERP was signiﬁcantly different from 0
(Wilcoxon signed-rank test, P < 0.01). Subplot labels: Brodmann areas (BAs)
over which electrodes were positioned. Colored areas: electrodes placed over
the primary motor cortex (red, BA4), the premotor cortex (yellow, BA6) and
the DLPFC (green, BA9). (B) Histogram of the stop-ERP sizes of panel (A).
Stop-ERP sizes were computed as the integral of absolute values of stop-ERP
voltage deﬂections in the interval periods marked by gray areas within SSRT.
Dashed line: threshold value for selecting the subset of channels with large
enough stop-ERPs used for population analyses (see Mattia et al., 2012 for
details). (C) Number of channels showing large enough average stop-ERPs
across ﬁve patients (n = 39) grouped by BA. Blue bar (others) represents
those areas where channels were not selected more than twice across all
patients. (D) Box plot of stop-ERP onsets measured with respect to the end
of SSRT across all selected channels in all patients. Stop-ERP onset was
deﬁned as the ﬁrst time that an electrode voltage was signiﬁcantly different
from 0. Diamonds indicate average onset times. Tick bars indicate the ﬁrst
and the third quartile. Vertical lines indicate the extreme time lags in the
channel group. Freely adapted from Mattia et al. (2012), with permission.
Additionally, it must be taken into account that arm move-
ments, unlike saccades, are not ballistic movements as they can
be stopped at any point along their path (De Jong et al., 1990;
Scangos and Stuphorn, 2010). As a consequence, their planning
can be modiﬁed even during the execution phase. This is in line
with the ﬁndings of Mirabella et al. (2008), who compared RTs
and movement times (MTs) of reaching movements toward visual
targets executed either during an RT task (go-only task) or dur-
ing a countermanding task. In both tasks subjects executed the
same movements, but in the countermanding task subjects were
aware that a stop-signal could randomly appear during move-
ment preparation, indicating that the pending action should be
suppressed. The awareness of the possible appearance of the stop-
signal creates a conﬂict on all no-stop trials because, despite the
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instructions to always move as fast as possible, subjects sponta-
neously tend to delay movement initiation to wait for the possible
occurrence of a stop-signal (e.g., Mirabella et al., 2006, 2012). This
is a common proactive strategy that subjects implicitly adopt to
have a greater chance of stopping their movements. However,
the proactive strategy was also found to affect the MTs, which
were shorter during the no-stop trials and longer during the
go-only trials. Probably the increased length of RTs during the
no-stop trials allowed subjects to fully process movement param-
eters and thus to move faster. In contrast, in go-only trials the
absence of a proactive brake allows a shortening of RTs, at the
cost of leaving some details of the motor program uncompleted,
so that the planning must be completed during the movement.
This strategy represents an optimization of costs versus beneﬁts
because shorter RTs are compensated by longer MTs and vice
versa.
Interestingly, Mirabella et al. (2013) demonstrated that STN
takes part in this process. In fact PD patients in which both DBS
were turned on behaved similarly to healthy subjects, whereas
when both DBS were off the same patients had both RTs and MTs
longer in no-stop trials than in go-only trials (Figure 8). Therefore
this study demonstrated the existence of a causal link between the
DBS of STN and the motor strategy exploited. Once again this
evidence favors the hypothesis that STN is not involved in a single
function (e.g., reactive inhibition); instead, more generally, it can
compute the payoff of an ongoing action.
THE MONITORING SYSTEM
In order to learn how to make good decisions, the brain needs
to compute, learn, and store the results of the outcomes that
were generated by its previous decisions. To this end the abil-
ity of computing predictions about future reward and the ability
of measuring discrepancies between attended and actual out-
comes are fundamental. These functions are performed by a
set of brain regions that collectively I will call the “monitor-
ing system” (Figure 1). This system is composed of a set of
cortical and subcortical structures that allow coding of reward
expectations, detection of errors and implementation of behav-
ioral adjustments, aiming to cope with more or less demanding
context in order to optimize future choices. Therefore signals
produced by the monitoring system can inﬂuence any stage of
action implementation.
A key role in this set of processes is played by the ACC, located
in the frontal medial wall (Figure 3). It has been known for
FIGURE 8 | Deep brain stimulation (DBS) of subthalamic nucleus
(STN) partially restores the appropriate motor strategy according to
the contexts. (A) Cumulative distribution of RTs (solid lines) and MTs
(dotted lines) of healthy subjects (n = 13) for go-only (red lines) and
no-stop (black lines) trials. (B) Cumulative distributions of RTs (solid lines)
and MTs (dotted lines) of DBS patients (n = 12) in DBS-ON and DBF-OFF
conditions for both go-only (red lines) and no-stop (black lines) trials. For
each condition the P -value of Kolmogorov–Smirnov test is given, both for
RTs and for MTs. (C) Histograms of average RTs of no-stop and go-only
trials in DBS-ON and DBF-OFF conditions. Bars represent the standard
error of the mean. (D) Histograms of average MTs of no-stop and go-only
trials in each DBS-ON and DBF-OFF condition. Bars represent the
standard error of the mean. Reproduced from Mirabella et al. (2013), with
permission from PLOS.
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a long time that this area is involved in cognitive control over
behavior (e.g., Bernstein et al., 1995; Botvinick et al., 1999); how-
ever, its precise role remains considerably debated. One inﬂuential
hypothesis is that the activity of ACC might represent the like-
lihood of obtaining or losing reward in response to particular
actions. Evidence in support of this idea comes from the results
of Brown and Braver (2005). They administered to human volun-
teers a stop-change task while recording the fMRI BOLD signal.
The task, (Figure 9), required participants to make rapid left-
or right-hand button-press responses according to the direction
of an arrow. In 33% of cases, during the RTs, a second arrow
pointing in the opposite directionwas presented and the responses
had to be reversed. Using a staircase algorithm, authors adjusted
the time of presentation of the second arrow, hence control-
ling the likelihood of making mistakes (either 10 or 50%). At
the beginning of each trial, participants were informed of the
error likelihood by a color cue: a blue bar indicated 50% error
probability, while a white bar indicated 10% error probability.
The activity of ACC was greater during the high error than dur-
ing the low error conditions. This held true not only during
change trials, but also during trials in which participants did
not have to change the responses (Figure 9). Therefore ACC
does not simply indicate response conﬂict (occurring when the
two arrows are presented) or error occurrence; instead more
generally it signals the perceived likelihood of potential errors.
Crucially, Brown and Braver (2005) exploiting a neural-network
model, showed that this pattern of response gradually emerged
over the course of the experimental session, i.e., after indi-
viduals learned the associations between color cue and error
likelihood.
Other studies point to a slightly different role for the ACC.
According to these accounts, ACC would provide a continuously
updated prediction of expected cognitive demand which will be
used to optimize future behavior. For instance, Sheth et al. (2012)
showed that ACC activity speeds up behavioral responses when
cognitive demand remain stable, but, in more challenging sit-
uations, it slows down responses to allow a greater accuracy.
Kennerley et al. (2006), studying the behavioral responses of mon-
keys before and after ACC lesions, conﬁrmed that this region
adaptively guides future behaviors, but exploiting a different
mechanism. In a key experiment, monkeys were rewarded when
performing a certain action (e.g., lifting a lever) until the rewarded
action was changed (e.g., to get the reward it had to turn the lever).
Non-lesioned monkeys had no difﬁcult in this task, while ACC-
lesioned monkeys following an unrewarded lift response switched
to turning, but could not sustain this response on subsequent
trials. Thus, the lesion compromised the ability to associate pay-
offs with the outcome of past actions to adaptively guide future
behavior.
Whatever the exact role of ACC in monitoring behavioral
performance, it appears that this capability develops through expe-
rience. It is very probable that the knowledge of past experiences is
built through reinforcement-learning processes, mediated by the
discharge of midbrain dopamine neurons. The discharge of these
neurons measures deviations from individuals’ previous reward
expectations, i.e., they compute the so-called prediction errors
(Schultz et al., 1997; O’Doherty et al., 2003; Bayer and Glimcher,
2005). Every time an event is better than expected, dopaminergic
neurons phasically increase their discharge. In contrast, they do
not change ﬁring rate when an event occurs as predicted, while
they decrease their discharge if something worse than expected
takes place. Prediction errors are thought to play a key role in
guiding decision-making by signaling the need to adjust future
behavior, i.e., they are fundamental to learning processes (Schultz
et al., 1997; Montague et al., 2004).
Dopaminergic neurons project widely to the striatum and to
several regions of PFC including the ACC (Freund et al., 1984;
Smith et al., 1994). The activity of ventral striatum seems to cor-
relate with prediction error computation (Bray and O’Doherty,
2007; Hare et al., 2008) and thus it is likely to contribute to some
further elaboration of action-outcome predictions. However,ACC
plays a different role from ventral striatum, exploiting prediction
errors as training signals to build extended action-outcome histo-
ries, that later could be exploited to adapt goal-directed behaviors
(Holroyd and Coles, 2002; Brown and Braver, 2005; Kennerley
et al., 2006). Given such a complex function, it is unlikely thatACC
would rely solely on signals coming from dopaminergic neurons.
In fact, other brain regions have been shown to produce signals
promoting learning. For instance, it has been shown that neurons
of the frontal pole cortex code the outcome of actions (Tsujimoto
et al., 2010; for a review see Tsujimoto et al., 2011). Also, neurons in
SMA and pre-SMA of monkeys have been shown to be modulated
by the amount of expected reward and thus these regions might,
among other things, be signaling expectation of reward too (Scan-
gos and Stuphorn, 2010). Not all studies point to this conclusion,
e.g., recently Bonini et al. (2014), by recording evoked ﬁeld poten-
tials in pharmacoresistant epileptic patients, claimed that SMA
continuously assesses ongoing actions and, when an error occurs,
it signals to ACC.
Whatever the exact role of each of these components, they form
a system that is capable of monitoring actions, evaluating their
behavioral outcomes, and learning the association between a cer-
tain environmental context and the likelihood that a certain action
or strategy will lead to the desired goal. Thus, the monitoring
system is the ideal candidate for implementing proactive prepa-
ration of action plans in anticipation of known task demands.
Such advance preparation has been studied in the context of
response inhibition, in particular when the countermanding task
is employed. This is because the rules of this paradigm produce
a conﬂict every time subjects have to execute no-stop trials (see
Figure 6A). As described above, this context induces a lengthen-
ing of the RTs and at the same time a shortening of MTs with
respect to situations in which the same movements have to be per-
formed, but stop-signals are never presented (e.g., Mirabella et al.,
2008, 2013).
The study of the neural underpinnings of proactive control
revealed that the network of brain regions that subserve this func-
tion largely overlaps with those subserving reactive inhibition.
This conclusion stems from several fMRI studies which employed
a probabilistic stop task with cues indicating the likelihood of
stop trial occurrence (e.g., Chikazoe et al., 2009; Zandbelt and
Vink, 2010; Jahfari et al., 2012; Zandbelt et al., 2013). Some cues
indicate that go-signals are never followed by a stop-signal (cer-
tain go-signals), whereas others indicate that go-signals have a
Frontiers in Systems Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org November 2014 | Volume 8 | Article 206 | 14
Mirabella Augmentation of goal-directed movements
FIGURE 9 | Role of ACC in predicting error likelihood. (A)Temporal
sequence of the visual displays for the change-signal task. Initially a
probability cue (plain line) was displayed. The cue could be either white or
blue, predicting low or high error likelihood respectively. After a delay, a go
signal was presented (left or right pointing arrow) indicating the required
button-press response (left or right index press for left or right pointing arrow,
respectively). Randomly on 33% of the trials a change signal was displayed (a
larger arrow pointing in the opposite direction with respect to that presented
as go signal). To this signal, subjects had to reverse the response from that
indicated by the go signal. Error rates were controlled by a staircase
procedure so that in the low error condition the delay between the go signal
and the change signal was kept shorter and subjects made around 90% of
correct responses. In the high error condition the delay was kept longer and
subjects made around 50% correct responses. (B) Brain regions highlighted
indicate the activation of ACC during the stop-change before and after
learning (the greater the activation, the deeper the red color) for correct,
wrong change-direction trials and for no-change trials (for the top to the
bottom row) in the low and high error conditions. Interestingly, during
no-change trials ACC activity increased with practice, especially in response
to blue color cues, reﬂecting an improved ability to predict the likelihood of
making an error. Freely adapted from Ridderinkhof and van denWildenberg
(2005), with permission.
certain likelihood of being followed by a stop-signal (uncertain
go-signals). By comparing brain activity between these con-
ditions, it has been possible to uncover the neural substrate
of advanced action preparation. Overall it emerged that when
subjects expect the occurrence of a stop-signal, they proac-
tively engage the network subserving reactive inhibition in a
progressively increasing fashion according to the likelihood of
stop presentation. A lower stop probability would correspond to
a weaker activation of the network and to less marked slowing
of responses, while when the stop is presented the activation is
much stronger and the motor output is completely blocked (Aron,
2011).
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These studies did not show clear activations of either of ACC
or midbrain dopaminergic neurons in the ventral tegmental area
and in the substantia near pars compacta (but see Zandbelt et al.,
2013). However, these might be due either to the fact that com-
monly a region-of-interest approach had been chosen or because
of limitations of the fMRI technique. Nevertheless, the activa-
tion of other components of the monitoring system, i.e., striatum,
SMA and pre-SMA, has been shown several times (Chikazoe et al.,
2009; Zandbelt and Vink, 2010; Jahfari et al., 2012; Zandbelt et al.,
2013). This activity might reﬂect the computations which underlie
learning of the association between the experimental context and
the likelihood of performing (or stopping) an action. Thus, these
signals should drive the proactive network so as to maximize the
probability of moving without missing stop trials. Further studies
are needed to test this hypothesis.
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
On the whole, it seems clear that the neural network subserv-
ing goal-directed actions is very extensive, encompassing both
frontal and parietal area as well as subcortical brain structures.
This does not come as a surprise, as we live in a complex and
ever-changing environment, which continuously offers an enor-
mous variety of opportunities for potential actions. Thus, our
motor system is called on to perform a continuous evaluation
of alternative actions that may become available, in order to
decide whether to persist in a given activity or to stop it and
switch to a different one. This is the hinge of our behavioral
ﬂexibility. Central to this feature are the abilities of predict-
ing the likelihood of achieving the desired goal with a certain
action or strategy, and of canceling pending actions when they
are no longer valuable. These two processes operate continu-
ously during the entire course of a movement, during its genesis,
its planning, and even its execution, so that the motor out-
put can be modulated or suppressed at any time before its
execution.
These considerations are clearly at odds with the old-fashioned
serial framework according to which “we sense the world, think
about it, and then act upon it” (Cisek and Kalaska, 2010, p. 271).
Instead, they are compatible with the idea of parallel process-
ing. Thus, one or more goals or actions can be coded at the
same time, so that alternatives can be ready for release at short
notice. Importantly, the evaluation of an action can also lead to
its suppression when it has already been selected. Very probably
the neural machinery underling action preparation and the neural
substrates underling action inhibition are simultaneously active.
From what is stated above, it is not too surprising that many of the
regions mediating the decisions to act appear to be involved also
in decisions to refrain from acting (Coxon et al., 2006; Mirabella
et al., 2011; Mattia et al., 2012; see Table 1). This leads to the main
point of the present review. Many, if not all, brain regions belong-
ing to the network which controls goal-oriented movements are
involved in more stages of this process. For instance, the SMA and
the pre-SMA are involved in the early “should-I-stay-or-should-
I-go” decision as they are involved in gating action affordances
(e.g., Sumner et al., 2007; Ridderinkhof et al., 2011). However,
they are also part of the monitoring system (see The Monitoring
System) and they contribute to the late “should-I-stay-or-should-
I-go” decision (Aron and Poldrack, 2006; Aron et al., 2007). In
addition it has been shown that stimulation of SMA generates a
feeling of an urge to move a particular body part, without nec-
essarily causing any actual movement (Fried et al., 1991). The
involvement of SMA in the feeling of volition has recently been
conﬁrmed by Fried et al. (2011)who recorded single-neuron activ-
ity in epileptic pharmacoresistant patients. Both PMd and M1 are
involved both in the genesis of motor plans (Tanji and Evarts,
1976; Weinrich et al., 1984; Hoshi and Tanji, 2000, 2002; Church-
land et al., 2006; Mattia et al., 2013; Shenoy et al., 2013) and also in
their inhibition (Coxon et al., 2006; Mirabella et al., 2011; Mattia
et al., 2012). Most of the network subserving reactive inhibition is
also involved in proactive inhibition (see Action Execution).
Some other brain regions are involved not solely in motor con-
trols, but also in very different tasks. The ACC has been shown to
be involved in monitoring behavioral performance (see The Mon-
itoring System), but also in pain processing (Singer et al., 2004).
The role of the IFG is even more controversial as it seems to per-
form several different functions, some of which are lateralized
(see Liakakis et al., 2011 for a review). The left IFG is implicated
in both perceptive and productive aspects of language (see Uddén
and Bahlmann, 2012 for a review). Some studies indicate that the
right IFG plays a key role in redirecting selective attention toward
unexpected stimuli (Corbetta and Shulman, 2002); others suggest
that it has a speciﬁc role inmotor inhibition (Aron et al., 2014) or in
suppression of unwanted memories (Benoit and Anderson, 2012).
In addition, the IFGof bothhemispheres are involved inprocessing
of symbolic gestures used for social non-verbal communication
(Lindenberg et al., 2012), and they are regions belonging to the
core of the human mirror-neuron system, i.e., of the system that
is thought to allow the ability of understanding the intentions of
others (for a review see Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004). Finally,
the PFC contribute to an enormous array of functions (for a review
see Wise, 2008).
Given this picture, I believe that is rather hard to assign a very
speciﬁc role to most of those regions when performing complex
cognitive functions, such as the augmentation of adaptive behav-
iors. Possibly, complex cognitive functions are not performed by a
unique structure. Rather, they might emerge from the coordinated
activity of large-scale neuronal networks that are dynamically
conﬁgured on ﬁxed anatomical connections (von der Malsburg
et al., 2010). The mechanisms underlying the dynamic coordina-
tion of neural populations are poorly understood. Nevertheless,
it has been suggested that the formation of functional networks
is achieved by modulating the degree of coherence among tem-
porally structured responses of widely distributed neurons. In
its turn, coherence might be modulated by rhythmic modula-
tion of activity and synchronization among these populations (see
Fries, 2005 for a review). According to this framework a given
brain region can perform speciﬁc operations, e.g., the right IFG
might subserve the reorienting of selective attention (Corbetta
and Shulman, 2002) or the ACC might compute the likelihood of
a successful action, but its functional features can be exploited in
a variety of tasks. Thus the outcome of complex processes would
depend not upon the activation of one or a few brain regions,
but on the speciﬁc interactions of the network activated during
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the ongoing task. This hypothesis would explain why the same
regions are active under many different contexts, and it might also
help to understand the limited success achieved by brain–machine
interfaces (BMIs; for reviews see Baranauskas, 2014; Bensmaia and
Miller, 2014).
The largemajority of BMI interfaces are aimedat restoringbody
mobility in patients suffering from motor deﬁcits caused by brain
injury, neurologic diseases and limb loss (Bensmaia and Miller,
2014). BMIs record brain signals, decode movement-related infor-
mation and use these to control external devices (e.g., prosthetic
limbs, wheelchairs). Although at present the BMI approach had
been fruitful (e.g., Hatsopoulos and Donoghue, 2009) it has also
shown several limitations. Patients have to undergo a long period
of training before learning how to use the BMIs, and signals
extracted from the brain are noisy and difﬁcult to interpret so the
error rate is rather high and the response speed is slow. All in all, the
guidance of external devices is still far from approximating natural
behaviors. This applies to both non-invasive and invasive BMIs.
Non-invasiveBMIs aremainly basedonEEGsignals recorded from
the scalp. Activity recorded at the scalp level lacks selectivity; it is
made up of a mix of signals coming from different cortical regions
and thus the amount of useable information conveyed is likely
to be too low (Baranauskas, 2014). On the other hand, invasive
BMIs employ multiple electrodes surgically inserted into the brain
(usually in M1 and/or the somatosensory cortex). Even though
the quality of the recorded signals is deﬁnitely better, informa-
tion transfer rate is still not dramatically improved (Baranauskas,
2014). The BMI approach has been shown to reproduce relatively
simple behaviors such as two-dimensional center-out reaching
tasks (e.g., Wolpaw and McFarland, 2004). Other much more
complex tasks, e.g., those entailing suppression of pending actions
(Mirabella, 2012), have almost never been tested (but see Ifft et al.,
2012). The relatively low degree of success of invasive BMI might
be due to the fact that, due to ethical reasons, it has been pos-
sible to capture only a very limited amount of the activity of
the neural network underling goal-directed actions. However, as
stated above, ﬂexible control of behavior can be achieved only
through the functional interactions of several brain regions, so it
is possible that signals recorded from a limited cortical area fail
to provide enough information to reproduce natural movements.
To overcome these limitations, it would be necessary to ﬁnd a
way to record simultaneously from several key regions underly-
ing goal-directed actions. Clearly, this is currently not feasible
on humans beings, though it could be tested on non-human
primates.
Before concluding, I would like to make an important remark:
all processes described in the present review, i.e., genesis and sup-
pression of goal-directed actions, do not require either intention,
volition, or awareness. These computations can be performed by
most animals, and surely by all primates. Not by chance, many
of the data described here come from studies on non-human pri-
mates. What exactly volition or free will is and how and when it
is generated from brain activity is, at best, unclear. There is a con-
sensus around the idea originally proposed by Libet et al. (1983)
that the awareness of intention precedes movements by some 100s
of milliseconds. Thus, it is possible that the brain generates a
action and, only subsequently, some pre-motor processes produce
the subjective experience of willing to execute that action, which
is perceived as being freely chosen (Hallett, 2007). To overcome
the impasse of these ﬁndings, Libet (1985) proposed that because
awareness of intention precedes movements, our free will should
rely on the ability to withhold upcoming actions (see Mirabella,
2007; Haggard, 2008 for reviews). However, it has been shown
that action suppression can be implemented unintentionally and
unconsciously (see van Gaal et al., 2008). Furthermore, both mon-
keys (e.g., Mirabella et al., 2011) and rats (e.g., Eagle et al., 2008)
can cancel pending movements. It has to be recognized that most
studies on action inhibition in humans rely on externally and not
on internally triggered stops (see Brass and Haggard, 2007 for an
original approach), so further evidence has to be collected before
venturing conclusions around the relationship between the veto
power and willingness. As Roskies (2010) stated: “For now, [. . .],
the most signiﬁcant contribution neuroscience has made has been
in allowing us to formulate novel questions about the nature of vol-
untary behavior, and in providing new ways of addressing them.” I
hope that the present review will also help to circumscribe what
free will is not.
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